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Were Immanuel Kant able to eavesdrop on contemporary debates about 
the morality of assisted dying, he would likely be puzzled by how his 
moral philosophy is invoked. On the one hand, many advocates for a moral 
right to assisted dying hold that individuals are entitled to a “death with 
dignity.” On this view, autonomous rational agents are sometimes mor-
ally entitled to end their lives when they judge that they are better off 
dying sooner rather than later. To bar physicians (or others) from provid-
ing assistance in dying would therefore be a wrongful infringement on an 
individual’s autonomy and his or her right to pursue a dignified death. The 
1997 “Philosophers’ Brief” on behalf of the legal permissibility of assisted 
dying typifies this perspective:
Each individual has a right to make the “most intimate and personal choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy.” That right encompasses the right 
to exercise some control over the time and manner of one’s death. . . . A per-
son’s interest in following his own convictions at the end of life is so central 
a part of the more general right to make “intimate and personal choices” for 
himself that a failure to protect that particular interest would undermine the 
general right altogether.1
Kant would no doubt hear in such appeals echoes of his own character-
istic moral doctrines— in particular, that because rational agents are to be 
1 Ronald Dworkin et al., “Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief,” New York Review of 
Books, March 27, 1997. Available at http:// www.nybooks.com/ articles/ archives/ 1997/ mar/ 27/ 
assisted- suicide- the- philosophers- brief.
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respected as ends in themselves, we are obligated to defer to their choices 
regarding their own welfare.
On the other hand, an eavesdropping Kant2 would almost certainly be 
shocked to see himself depicted as an ally of a moral right to end one’s 
life with the assistance of others. For while Kant had little to say specifi-
cally about assistance in dying, he was emphatic in his denunciations of 
suicide. In his Lectures on Ethics, for example, Kant says that those who 
engage in suicide treat themselves as little better than animals and should 
be seen as “carrion” (LE 27:372) with no “inner worth” (LE 27:344). And 
although we ought to sympathize with those suffering from “grief, worry, 
and depression,” suicide itself should inspire “revulsion” or “hate” (LE 
27:372– 375). As discussed later, Kant would be particularly puzzled by 
invocations of “dignity” as a moral basis for the right to end one’s life. 
For in Kant’s eyes, human dignity is precisely what morally rules out such 
a right. And presumably, if Kant believed that there is no general right to 
end one’s life, he would also have believed that there is no right to others’ 
assistance in doing so.
Our aim here is to sort out, historically and philosophically, what 
Kant’s understanding of dignity implies about assisted dying. Unlike 
many commentators, I  am fairly sympathetic to Kant’s argument that 
suicide violates duties to oneself and specifically that the general right 
to make choices regarding our own welfare is coherent only if we also 
are subject to a duty to preserve the rational agency exercised in mak-
ing such choices. Nevertheless, I contend that Kant’s argument does not 
establish an obligation to forego suicide (and hence, an obligation on the 
part of others not to assist in suicide) in each and every case. Although 
Kant’s ethics, and his notion of dignity in particular, cannot be deployed 
to defend a broad permission for suicide akin to that favored by the “death 
with dignity” movement, it also does not entail as restrictive a stance on 
morally permissible suicide, or on assisted dying, as Kant might have 
supposed.
To home in on this modified Kantian position, we first need an accu-
rate grasp of Kant’s notion of dignity. To that end, the first section situates 
2 References to Kant’s works are as follows: Parenthetical references are to the Lectures on 
Ethics (LE), Metaphysics of Morals (G), and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (MM). 
Citations are to volume and page numbers in the Berlin Akademie Edition of Kant’s works 
(1901– ). Translations of LE are from Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. J. B. Schneewind, 
trans. P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Translations of G and MM are 
from Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. M. J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
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Kant’s notion in relation to other historically prominent notions of dignity. 
The next section outlines how Kant deploys his notion of dignity in his 
arguments for a fairly stringent duty of self- preservation and indicates how 
this duty entails the wrongfulness of assisted dying. Then, I defend Kant’s 
understanding of dignity and how it generates a duty of self- preservation 
against contemporary Kantians who invoke dignity in defense of assisted 
dying. The following sections identify two kinds of “hopeless” situations 
that fall outside the scope of Kant’s arguments for the moral impermissi-
bility of suicide and assisted dying. I thus conclude that although Kant’s 
arguments against a right to assisted dying are formidable and arguably 
rest on a more defensible conception of dignity than that used by puta-
tively Kantian defenders of “death with dignity,” the best version of Kant’s 
position does not absolutely preclude assisted dying.
Dignity, Kantian and Otherwise
As Michael Rosen3 has documented, dignity has had different meanings 
throughout its history. Let us therefore catalog various historically promi-
nent understandings of dignity so as to pinpoint what distinguishes Kant’s 
notion of dignity from rival understandings.
First, in some traditions, dignity is an attribute belonging only to certain 
noteworthy persons. The ancient Romans, for instance, associated dignitas 
with royalty or other high social rank. Those with dignity were thereby 
owed a measure of deference or esteem. The Romans would thus likely 
be taken aback by the notion of dignity articulated in the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, wherein “all members of the 
human family” have “inherent dignity” or “worth.”4
In contrast, on Kant’s understanding of dignity, it is possessed by all 
practically rational agents. Individuals with what Kant calls “humanity” 
are able to choose both the ends they pursue and the means best suited to 
the realization of their ends. In so doing, according to Kant, practically 
rational agents exhibit the capacity to choose on the basis of rational prin-
ciples or, in Kant’s own vernacular, to give themselves a “law” for rational 
action. It is this capacity for rational lawgiving that grounds Kantian 
3 Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2012).
4 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 1948), 
Preamble. Available at http:// www.un.org/ en/ universal- declaration- human- rights, accessed 
November 14, 2016.
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dignity.5 Kant speaks of the “dignity of a rational being, who obeys no 
law other than that which he himself at the same time gives” (G 4:434) 
and of our capacity for “lawgiving itself” that “must for that very reason 
have a dignity” (G 4:436; see also G 4:439). For Kant, “autonomy,” or our 
capacity to rationally choose— and act on the basis of— principles, is “the 
ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (G 
4:436). These rational capacities are not the province of the few, according 
to Kant. One need not be well born or a “dignitary” in order to have these 
elementary rational capacities of choice and action. Kantian dignity is thus 
effectively universal, the possession of all beings with practically rational 
capacities.
Second, some moral traditions follow Kant in holding that, for example, 
all human individuals have dignity, but they maintain that dignity itself 
is variegated so that not all such individuals have it in the same manner 
or to the same degree. Within Roman Catholic thinking, for example, all 
humans possess dignity, but the specific nature or magnitude of one’s dig-
nity depends on one’s social role. Rosen summarizes the Roman Catholic 
stance as follows:
All members of society have dignity, but their dignity consists in the role 
that is appropriate to their station within a hierarchical social order, one in 
which some are “nobler than others.” Instead of sharing in equal dignity, the 
orders of society should differ in “dignity, rights, and power.”6
On this conception of dignity, the dignity of priests differs from that of the 
laity, that of men differs from that of women, and so on. However, Kant’s 
conception of dignity is unified. There is but one species of dignity, and all 
those with dignity possess it in the same manner and to the same degree. 
The dignity of a king neither exceeds nor is exceeded by the dignity of a 
pauper. Dignity is thus equal in its distribution.
Another distinguishing feature of Kant’s conception of dignity is that 
it is unmerited. On some understandings of dignity, it is ascribed to those 
with a high level of moral character or wherewithal. Friedrich Schiller, for 
instance, thought of dignity as a “mastery of instinct by moral force.” For 
5 Kant also associates dignity with morality or our capacity to be moral (G 4:425, G 4:435, G 
4:440). However, these passages can plausibly be read as affirming the claim that dignity rests 
on our capacities for practical rationality. See Michael Cholbi, Understanding Kant’s Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 111– 112.
6 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning, 49.
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Schiller, the dignified person exerts a form of self- control over morally 
recalcitrant desires and thereby acts rightly.7 Kant agrees with Schiller that 
a person deserves special moral credit when she resists desires that incline 
her to act immorally. Hence, our dignity is most plainly in view when we 
act morally. (G 4:435, MM 6:405) Nevertheless, he did not share with 
Schiller the belief that dignity is any type of moral accomplishment. For 
Kant, dignity is neither earned through morally praiseworthy action nor 
relinquished through morally blameworthy actions. Even the condemned 
murderer, Kant argues, retains dignity that precludes our justifiably tortur-
ing him, humiliating him, and so on (MM 6:333).
In a similar vein, some conceptions of dignity view it as a property 
of a person’s bearing or demeanor. A person who exhibits steadfastness, 
independence, or tranquility, especially when confronting great adver-
sity, is thereby dignified. This is one plausible way to gloss what advo-
cates of assisted dying have in mind when they speak of a death “with 
dignity”:  a death in which a person is not racked with pain and able 
to keep his perceptual and cognitive faculties about him.8 Kant would 
certainly agree that some behaviors we exhibit when under physical or 
mental strain are contrary to our dignity. He claims that “complaining 
and whining, even crying out in bodily pain, is unworthy” of beings 
with dignity (MM 6:436). But in such instances, it is the antecedent fact 
that we have dignity that makes it morally unseemly to behave in these 
ways. Again, we do not acquire dignity by behaving in dignified ways, 
nor do we lose it by behaving in undignified ways. Our dignity, Kant 
says, is not dependent on our actions or behavior and is in fact “inalien-
able” (MM 6:436).
These attributes of Kant’s conception of dignity— that dignity is univer-
sal, unified, equal, and inalienable— go some way in vindicating Kant’s 
claim to be the “father of the modern concept of human dignity.”9 For 
we see in Kant’s conception of dignity a deeply egalitarian moral ethos 
at work. Dignity is a kind of high status, according to Kant, but one that 
elevates each and every human rational agent to that same high status. 
Kant would thus find the United Nations Declaration’s understanding of 
dignity— that because all “human beings are born free and equal in dignity” 
7 Friedrich Schiller, On Grace and Dignity, trans. G. Gregory (Washington, D.C.: Schiller Institute, 
[1793] 1992).
8 Jyl Gentzler, “What Is a Death with Dignity?”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 
(2003): 461– 462.
9 Christopher McCrudden, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights,” 
European Journal of International Law 19 (2008): 655– 724.
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and “endowed with reason,” they are thereby entitled to basic “rights and 
freedoms . . . without distinction of any kind”10— highly congenial.
Dignity, Price, and the Logic of Suicide
As noted previously, whereas many contemporary advocates of assisted 
dying understand dignity as licensing a right to choose one’s own death, 
Kant clearly understood dignity as a source of duties to self— duties that 
prohibit the intentional taking of one’s own life. The source of their dis-
pute stems from the fact that, for Kant, dignity is not only a property that 
practically rational agents have. It is also a measure or kind of value, to be 
distinguished from price:
Everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced 
by something as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all 
price and therefore admits of no equivalent has dignity. . . . That which con-
stitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself 
has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, 
dignity. (G 4:434– 435)
Priceable goods, Kant claims, are fungible: It is both possible and mor-
ally permissible to exchange such good for one another. We do so when-
ever we exchange material goods, sell our labor to one another, or conduct 
monetary transactions. Goods with a price are valuable either as means to 
the attainment of our chosen ends or because they are among our chosen 
ends. In contrast, that which has dignity, Kant claims, is an “end in itself” 
with “inner worth,” not to be traded for priceable goods or for other goods 
with dignity. According to Kant, whatever has dignity has an “uncondi-
tional” and “incomparable” worth, a worth not commensurate with the 
“relative worth” of any priceable good (G 4:436). In conjunction with 
Kant’s account of what has dignity (discussed previously), this taxonomy 
of value implies that rational agency is a distinctive good such that we 
are not morally entitled to attach a price to it or to trade it for what has 
price. Dignity is that through which rational agents are elevated “above all 
other beings in the world that are not human beings,” beings that may per-
missibly be treated as “things.” Rational agency must therefore be treated 
as an end in itself rather than merely as a means (MM 6:462). To sell a 
10 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 1 and 2.
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human being into slavery, for example, is at odds with her dignity, for 
one is thereby limiting a person’s liberty, and encumbering her rational 
agency, in exchange for money, a merely priceable good. Slave sales thus 
wrongfully treat an end in itself as a commodity to be used for furthering 
of others’ goals or purposes.
But (Kant argues) self- killing is not fundamentally different from selling 
a person into slavery, inasmuch as when a person aims to end her life, she 
aims to destroy her own rational agency so as to further her own purposes. 
In so doing, a person wrongfully treats her rational agency as a means to her 
own happiness rather than (as the dignity of our rational agency demands) 
treating her rational agency as an end in itself: “A human being cannot be 
used merely as a means by any human being (either by others or even by 
himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end” (MM 6:462, 
emphasis added). Hence, to end one’s life because doing so will, in one’s 
own judgment, make for a better or happier life overall is to subordinate 
one’s rational agency, which (again) has incomparably valuable dignity, to 
one’s happiness, a “discretionary” good that merely has price. “Disposing 
of oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end is debasing” to our 
rational agency (MM 6:423) and contrary to our dignity. In effect then, 
Kant viewed suicide as practically contradictory— as an exercise of one’s 
rational agency in which one destroys the very agency that grounds the 
value of one’s choices in the first place (G 4:435). Suicide is thus at odds 
with “the first, though not the principal, duty of a human being to himself as 
an animal being”— the duty of self- preservation (MM 6:422).11
Before considering how Kant’s anti- suicide argument denies a right 
to assisted dying, a few observations regarding the distinctive features of 
Kant’s anti- suicide argument are in order.
First, note that Kant’s opposition to suicide largely makes calculations 
of future happiness irrelevant to the moral justifiability of suicide. He 
is largely untroubled about whether an act of suicide is in fact prudent. 
Rather, his argument is meant to show that an individual’s happiness sim-
ply cannot justify suicide:
Neither the greatest advantages, nor the highest degree of well- being, nor 
the most excruciating pains and even irremediable bodily sufferings can 
11 Here, I set aside the argument for a duty of self- preservation that Kant provides in the 
Groundwork (4:422), appealing to the alleged inability of a maxim permitting suicide from 
“self- love” to be consistently universalized. Few commentators find it compelling and many 
believe it lacks a proper basis in Kant’s own ethical thinking. For further discussion, see Cholbi, 
Understanding Kant’s Ethics, 184.
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give a man the authority to take his own life, to escape from anguish and 
enter earlier upon a hoped- for higher happiness. (LE 27:628)
Second, Kant is also unconcerned with whether suicidal acts violate 
duties to others. Although his moral theory does not rule out that possibil-
ity (MM 6:423– 424), Kant understands self- preservation as a duty we owe 
to ourselves. Thus, irrespective of whether a suicidal act wrongs others, it 
nevertheless violates a duty we owe ourselves as rational beings.
Finally, as the previous discussion of Kant’s understanding of dignity 
underscores, the duty not to take one’s own life is one that applies to us 
simply insofar as we are rational beings. Hence, all beings with dignity 
(i.e., all practically rational beings) have an obligation to forego suicide. 
Kant’s duty does not make provisions for special pleading on behalf of the 
well born, those with particular social statuses, and so on.
One might assume that there is a direct logical path from Kant’s moral 
opposition to suicide to a similar moral rejection of assisted dying. After 
all, if ending one’s own life is wrong, and aiding another person in com-
mitting a moral wrong is itself wrong, then presumably Kant would hold 
that aiding another person in ending her life is wrong. There is, however, 
one complication here. The Kantian duty of self- preservation is classified 
as a duty of virtue rather than a duty of right (MM 6:329). A duty of right is 
one we can be compelled to fulfill via “external” compulsion or coercion. 
The duty not to steal, for example, is a duty individuals can be compelled 
to fulfill by threats of legal punishment. The duty of self- preservation, in 
contrast, is one we fulfill only when we not only keep ourselves alive but 
also do so because self- preservation is among the ends we endorse. But, 
Kant argues, although others can compel us to act in particular ways, they 
cannot compel us to act in those ways on the basis of particular ends or 
reasons. Our ends or reasons are wholly our own. The fulfillment of our 
duties to self is thus the result of “free self- constraint” (MM 6:382). Strictly 
speaking, then, the duty of self- preservation and, therefore, the duty not to 
take one’s own life are not enforceable duties, according to Kant.
That the duty of self- preservation is a non- enforceable duty of virtue 
might appear to weaken the Kantian case against the legal permissibil-
ity of assisted dying on the grounds that the state ought not to make law 
aimed at compelling individuals to fulfill a duty that in fact they cannot 
be compelled by others to fulfill. This inference is mistaken, however. For 
even if the state could not compel individuals to fulfill their duty of self- 
preservation by outlawing assisted dying, the law could nevertheless shape 
attitudes toward assisted dying and hence influence whether the duty in 
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question is fulfilled. Those inclined to shorten their lives encounter fewer 
obstacles if assisted dying is legally permissible. Indeed, a legal regime 
that permits assisted dying in effect offers inducements to violate our 
Kantian duty of self- preservation. The role of law here is thus asymmetri-
cal: It cannot compel this duty’s fulfillment, but it can certainly contribute 
to its non- fulfillment. Similarly, a person cannot compel a problem drinker 
to honor her self- regarding duty not to stupefy herself with intoxicating 
substances. Only the problem drinker can fulfill that duty. But a person 
can contribute to the duty’s not being fulfilled by tempting the problem 
drinker with alcohol.
Kant Versus Kantians on Dignity and Assisted Dying
As discussed previously, supporters of assisted dying often appeal to dig-
nity and associate it with recognizably Kantian values such as rational 
agency. Kant himself invokes dignity and claims that our rational agency 
grounds a duty of self- preservation that presumptively speaks against 
assisted dying. Here, I offer a sketch of why Kant’s view appears to have 
the upper hand in this dispute.
Kant and supporters of assisted dying agree that because we are auton-
omous rational agents, we have broad rights to decide in what our welfare 
consists and how others may treat us. Our liberty to decide, independently 
of the wills of others, our own ways of life is a reflection of the special 
moral value of rational agency. Others are generally morally required to 
defer to our choices about our own welfare and way of life because we are 
rational agents, just as we are required to defer to theirs because they are 
rational beings. Our rational agency thus establishes broad moral permis-
sions for agents to act as their own judgment concerning their welfare 
dictates.
For Kant, our rational agency serves a second moral role— namely 
grounding duties to respect our own rational agency— and in fact could not 
serve this other role unless it did so. Consider the first role, establishing a 
broad moral permission to choose our own ends and how best to pursue 
them. Suppose this discretion rested on some value or good V1 over which 
we had similar discretion such that V1 imposed no moral constraints on 
how we may respond to it. There would seem to need to be some still fur-
ther value or good V2 that grounds our discretion over V1. If we had the 
same discretion over V2, then there would have to be some further value 
or good V3 that grounds our discretion over V2. But such a regress would 
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have to terminate in some value or good of a different order or kind— a 
value or good over which we did not have this sort of discretion but which 
required our deference or respect. Kant believed that our rational agency 
is the value or good that halts this regress. Unless our rational agency 
imposed duties on us, including a duty of self- preservation, the discre-
tion over own ends and the means thereunto that we enjoy would not be 
coherent.12
Hence, for Kantian supporters of death with dignity, our rational agency 
is purely a source of moral discretion or liberty. But for Kant, discretion 
cannot be the seed of morality. Discretion must ultimately flow from a 
value or good toward which we must defer. For Kant, there can only be 
something that counts as a person’s good if persons are themselves sources 
of value. As David Velleman states,
What’s good for you wouldn’t matter if you didn’t matter. . . . What’s good 
for a person is worth caring about only out of concern for the person, and 
hence only insofar as he is worth caring about. A person’s good has only 
hypothetical or conditional value, which depends on the value of the person 
himself.13
Our rational agency thus does not merely confer value on our ends. It 
is also a value we must live up to or honor. A person’s rational agency 
“isn’t something that he can accept or decline, since it isn’t a value for 
him; it’s a value in him, which he can only violate or respect.”14 Our dig-
nity (which, again, we possess due to our being rational agents) thus bars 
rather than authorizes ending our own lives and eliciting others’ assistance 
in doing so.
I cannot claim to have offered a decisive basis for favoring Kant’s under-
standing of dignity’s demands over that of contemporary Kantian defenders 
of “death with dignity.” Nevertheless, these remarks shift the argumentative 
burden onto assisted dying’s ostensibly Kantian supporters to explain how 
the value of rational agency can both be the source of the moral discretion 
they embrace and also fall within the scope of that very discretion.
In summary, Kant’s notion of dignity is distinctive in being universal, 
unified, equal, and unmerited. Only rational agency has dignity rather than 
12 J. David Velleman, “A Right of Self- Termination?”, Ethics 109 (1999): 611– 612.
13 Velleman, “A Right of Self- Termination?”, 611. See also Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics 
and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 26.
14 Velleman, “A Right of Self- Termination?”, 625.
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price, and we are therefore required to respect said agency by preserving 
the bodies through which we exercise such agency. Kant thus disagrees 
with contemporary Kantian defenders of a right to assisted dying about the 
role dignity has in the structure of our moral duties.
Exception 1: Permanent and Irreversible Cessation 
of Practical Agency
Kant’s prohibition on suicide and assisted dying casts a wide net. Indeed, 
any prudential self- killing, in which one attempts to terminate one’s life so 
as to result in a life perceived as happier, is seemingly ruled out. However, 
if there are conditions that result in individuals lacking the properties 
needed to ground dignity, then self- killing would not be wrong on Kantian 
grounds.15 There are two kinds of “hopeless” situation wherein, I contend, 
Kant’s prohibition would not apply precisely because such conditions are 
not met.
The first is relatively straightforward: The dignity we have due to our 
being practically rational agents is the basis for Kant’s opposition to 
assisted dying. However, some individuals undergo conditions in which 
their practical agency has permanently and irreversibly ceased to function. 
Individuals in permanent vegetative states or those with severe dementia 
lack the capacities Kant associates with dignity, namely the capacity to 
identify ends worthy of pursuit and the means best suited to the realization 
of those ends. Such individuals, although biologically alive, are (from a 
Kantian perspective at least) practically dead, inasmuch as the properties 
that lend them their moral status are no longer present. In such cases, we 
cannot fail to respect that which provides human agents their dignity, for 
the properties needed for dignity are no longer in evidence. Thus, for such 
individuals to receive assistance in dying would not violate Kant’s demand 
that we treat rational agents with dignity.
Granted, such situations are not commonplace, and such a conclu-
sion obviously raises several practical issues, most notably, how to deter-
mine that a person has permanently and irreversibly lost the capacities 
associated with practically rational agency. Nevertheless, a recognizably 
Kantian position can allow that a person who, having been diagnosed 
with progressive dementia, wishes to receive assistance in dying once her 
15 Michael Cholbi, “A Kantian defense of prudential suicide,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, no. 4 
(2010), 489– 515, 493– 494.
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practical rationality has been wholly vitiated has a moral right to do so. In 
so doing, she is exercising a Kantian power to determine what will be done 
to her body once she lacks the capacity to exert power over it. She in effect 
directs others as to how her “practical remains” ought to be disposed of.
This conclusion should not be exaggerated. It does not entail that indi-
viduals who have permanently and irreversibly lost their capacities for 
practical agency are obligated to end their lives prematurely, nor does it 
carry the implication that others may end their lives. The absence of the 
morally relevant properties whose presence establishes a moral prohibi-
tion on self- killing does not entail a moral requirement of self- killing.16 
But those rational agents who assert a right to dispose of their bodies once 
their rational agency is no more do not act in opposition to the Kantian 
value of dignity.
Exception 2: Nihilism and the Lack of Categorical Desires
The second “hopeless” situation falling outside the Kantian prohibition on 
assisted dying occurs when individuals come to lack prudential reasons to 
continue living.
Many individuals undergo difficult stretches of life in which they are 
profoundly pessimistic. They may believe that they live in a world hostile 
to their ends, that they lack the skills needed to realize those ends, and that 
they have no legitimate place in the world and are burdensome to others.17 
For such individuals, happiness— understood in Kant’s terms as the “com-
plete well- being and satisfaction with one’s condition” (G 4:393)— feels 
particularly elusive or remote. Unsurprisingly, pessimistic individuals may 
feel drawn to end their lives. The pain or frustration they feel at seem-
ingly being unable to live a satisfactory or contented life may lead them to 
believe that a shorter life is better than one that continues forward.
Let us envision a more extreme version of the pessimist, the nihilist. 
The nihilist likely began as a pessimist, someone saddened by her appar-
ent inability to realize the ends that constitute her happiness. But whereas 
the pessimist is still genuinely committed to particular ends, the nihilist 
has become wholly disenchanted, to the point at which she no longer 
has ends at all. Note that this is not to say that the nihilist has no wants. 
She may, for instance, have other- regarding preferences (e.g., desiring 
16 Michael Cholbi, “Kant on Euthanasia and the Duty to Die: Clearing the Air,” Journal of Medical 
Ethics 41, no. 8 (2015): 607– 610.
17 Thomas Joiner, Why People Die by Suicide (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
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that others she cares about flourish). She will also likely care about how 
her life goes so long as she is alive— that is, she will prefer not to suffer 
physical pain or deprivation. In terms made familiar by Bernard Williams, 
the nihilist retains conditional desires— desires predicated upon her con-
tinued existence. However, the nihilist is so disenchanted that she lacks 
altogether categorical desires— desires that give her a reason to continue 
to live.18
Both the pessimist and the nihilist have recognizably prudential rea-
sons to seek to end their lives, but their reasons differ. The pessimist 
believes her life is (or will inevitably be) bad, an existence filled with 
pain or frustration at her ends going unmet. The nihilist, in contrast, 
believes her life is (or will inevitably be) pointless, an existence with no 
cognizable purpose or aim. However, Kant would likely argue that sui-
cide or assisted dying would not be morally permissible in either case. 
In seeking to end their lives, both the pessimist and the nihilist run afoul 
of their duty of self- preservation and, specifically, fail to respect their 
rational agency as end in itself with dignity. Despondency, even out and 
out nihilism, does not appear to nullify the dignity we possess as practi-
cally rational agents.
I contend that although Kant’s conclusions regarding pessimistic sui-
cide are reasonable in light of his own moral doctrines, his conclusion that 
nihilistic suicide is similarly morally impermissible rests on a subtle error 
regarding rational agency, dignity, and their relation to price.
By Kant’s lights, the nihilist is a moral agent. Despite her complete 
detachment from any ends whose fulfillment might constitute her hap-
piness, she is nevertheless capable of moral reasoning, able to act from 
moral principles, and so on. In Kantian terms, the nihilist can acknowledge 
the force of categorical imperatives but recognizes the rational force of no 
hypothetical imperatives. The nihilist retains the dignity associated with 
moral personality despite having lost the dignity associated with humanity 
or practical agency.19 For Kant, the absence of the latter dimension of dig-
nity does not change the individual’s status as an object of moral duties; 
she is still subject to all the same self- regarding duties as before, including 
the moral prohibition on self- killing.
Yet the nihilist is not a full- blown Kantian agent. For if she has perma-
nently lost the ability to set ends (i.e., to identify states of affairs whose 
18 Bernard Williams, “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality,” in 
Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973): 82– 100.
19 Cholbi, “A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide,” 502– 503; Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 94.
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realization she is committed to and which she is thereby motivated to pur-
sue), she has lost one of the two capacities that constitute her practical 
agency and dignity. This opens, I propose, a narrow alley for a form of 
suicide or assisted dying that falls outside Kant’s prohibition.
To understand this, contrast the nihilist’s prospective suicide with that 
of the pessimist. What Kant objects to in the suicide of the pessimist is her 
prioritizing her personal discretionary ends, whose worth is conditional 
on her setting these as her ends, over the unconditional worth of her own 
rational agency. The wrong in question consists in a transaction wherein 
the pessimist trades what has dignity (her own rational agency) for what 
has price (her happiness, or the ends that constitute it). But this analysis 
does not, indeed cannot, apply to the nihilist’s suicide. Assuming that the 
nihilist is not engaging in altruistic suicide, ending her life so as to advance 
the ends of others, her personal reasons for suicide are not that a shorter 
life will be a happier or better life in any standard sense. Rather, her sui-
cide is justified by appeal to the thought that continued existence has no 
point, not that it would have a point that will go unfulfilled. The nihilist is 
therefore not engaged in the transaction that, by Kant’s lights, makes the 
pessimist’s suicide morally impermissible. The nihilist is not trading her 
dignity for what has price. She is instead opting to jettison a future that 
has no value to her.
This conclusion is further vindicated by considering the previously pre-
sented regress argument used to defend Kant’s conception of dignity . That 
argument held (roughly) that only if our rational agency has the priceless 
value of dignity are we morally entitled to authority over the priceable 
ends whose pursuit constitutes our happiness. But note that a nihilistic 
individual has no such ends over which to exercise her authority. Hence, 
this regress argument cannot get off the ground in her case, and so we can-
not infer that her rational agency has the incomparable worth that (accord-
ing to Kant) morally disallows her destroying the body through which that 
agency would otherwise be exercised. Stated more directly in terms of dig-
nity, merely possessing the dignity of personality is insufficient to ground 
the Kantian prohibition on suicide and assisted dying. One must also have 
the dignity of humanity in order to be in a position to perform the morally 
objectionable transaction Kant saw as the root of suicide’s wrongfulness. 
For absent the capacity to set ends that serve as categorical desires, we are 
moral subjects but not moral objects— that is, not beings whom we and 
others owe respect.20 Nihilistic suicide thus cannot fail to respect one’s 
20 Cholbi, “A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide,” 507– 509.
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humanity or honor one’s dignity. Kant erred, I propose, in holding that 
possessing even a fragmentary form of practical rational agency confers 
upon us a priceless dignity that bars suicide. The Kantian wrong of sui-
cide is not best described in terms of its failing to respect human dignity. 
It consists instead of failing to respect human dignity by prioritizing the 
priceable good of one’s happiness above what has dignity. That, I have 
argued, nihilists do not and cannot do.21
Admittedly, permanent or irreversible nihilism (like the permanent loss 
of practical agency considered in previously) is not a common condition. 
However, the sort of hopelessness and disenchantment I have ascribed to 
nihilism are not uncommon in those with suicidal ideation.22 And so in 
what we might think of as the worst or most hopeless cases, those in which 
individuals either have lost the capacity for practical agency altogether or 
are irrevocably unable to identify ends they deem worthy of pursuit, sui-
cide and assisted dying do not treat our rational agency (or our dignity) 
merely as a means. My modified Kantian view can thus embrace the moral 
permissibility of suicide in a handful of cases.
Conclusion
There are two kinds of “hopeless” cases in which, Kant’s appeal to the 
priceless value of human dignity notwithstanding, the Kantian moral pro-
hibition on suicide and, by extension, a prohibition on assisted dying do 
not apply. Note that neither case questions the fundamental soundness of 
Kant’s arguments or overall moral stance. Rather, they illustrate that the 
scope of Kant’s arguments is not quite as wide as he supposed because 
the psychological conditions presupposed in his arguments do not always 
obtain. For those with permanent and irreversible loss of practical agency 
and those with hopeless nihilism do not meet the psychological back-
ground conditions regarding rational agency that Kant’s argument pre-
supposes. Of course, even with these exceptions, the modified Kantian 
position on assisted dying I  have articulated here establishes a much 
21 For a more detailed exposition of this argument concerning the permissibility of nihilistic 
suicide, see Cholbi, “A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide,” 504– 510.
22 Martin Seligman has proposed that suicidal thinking accompanies learned helplessness. See 
Martin Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death (New York: Freeman, 
1992). Hopelessness also appears to be an indicator of suicidal thinking,. See E. David Klonsky 
et al., “Hopelessness as a Predictor of Attempted Suicide among First Admission Patients 
with Psychosis: A 10- Year Cohort Study,” Suicide and Life- Threatening Behavior 41, no. 1 
(2012): 1– 10.
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narrower moral permission than most contemporary liberal Kantian advo-
cates of assisted dying would likely prefer. For if this modified Kantian 
position is plausible, then although death with dignity remains incoherent 
in Kant’s eyes, some instances of assisted dying at least count as deaths 
not at odds with dignity.
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